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TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION 
OVER CIVIL DISPUTES INVOLVING 
NON-INDIANS: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 
INSURANCE COS. V. CROW TRIBE 
OF INDIANS AND A PROPOSAL 
FOR REFORM 
Long before their contact with Europeans, North American 
Indian tribes were independent, self-governing communities1 
with virtually unlimited power over their own members.2 Several 
centuries of dealings with European nations, and later the 
United States, have left them in the peculiar position of being 
nations3 within a nation-entities that the federal government, 
courts, and legal scholars continue to recognize as sovereign 
powers• but that are subject to the "plenary power" of Con-
gress.11 On the one hand, the tribes, as nations, are said to pos-
sess inherently all powers held by any sovereign government.6 
The European nations and the United States, until 1871,7 made 
treaties with the tribes as they would with any other sovereign 
nation,8 in recognition of their sovereign powers. On the other 
1. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 229 (1982). 
2. "[P]rior to European colonization and settlement of the North American conti-
nent, Indian tribes and nations possessed full jurisdiction over the territories they occu-
pied and the people within those territories." TASK FORCE FOUR: FEDERAL, STATE, AND 
TRIBAL JURISDICTION, REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION 1 (Comm. 
Print 1976) [hereinafter AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR] (Final Report to American Indian 
Policy Review Comm'n). 
3. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), Chief Justice Marshall's opin-
ion for the Court noted that the term "nation" has been generally applied to the Indians, 
recognizing them as "a people distinct from others." Id. at 559. "Nation" is a word of our 
own language that has "a definite and well understood meaning" and has been applied to 
the Indians in the same sense as to the other nations of the earth. Id. at 559-60. 
4. See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
6. 1 AMERICAN INDIAN Poucv REVIEW CoMM'N, FINAL REPORT 101 (Comm. Print 1977) 
[hereinafter 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT] (Final Report to Congress). 
7. Congress discontinued making treaties with the tribes in 1871. F. COHEN, supra 
note 1, at 208 n.8. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 71 (1982)). 
8. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832). 
217 
218 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:l 
hand, these sovereign powers are subject to limitation or divest-
ment by Congress. 9 
The powers of a sovereign government are generally under-
stood to include the power to establish courts and exercise juris-
diction over disputes arising within the boundaries of its terri-
tory.10 Indian tribes certainly retain such powers to some degree, 
but the exact extent of this retention of authority is uncertain. 
Although the courts have recognized exclusive tribal court juris-
diction over reservation-based civil cases involving only Indi-
ans, 11 the scope of tribal jurisdiction over civil cases involving 
both Indians and non-Indians12 is not yet fully determined. The 
extensive interaction between Indians and non-Indians on reser-
vations13 and the increasing willingness and ability of tribal 
9. See infra notes 32-47 and accompanying text. 
10. "The powers of sovereign governments are familiar: the power to enact laws; the 
power to establish court systems; [and) the power to require people to abide by estab-
lished laws .... " 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 99. 
11. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 342. The issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction over both 
Indians and non-Indians is more complicated. See generally id. at 335-41. In Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the Supreme Court concluded that Indian 
tribes do not possess retained criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because such juris-
diction would be "inconsistent with their status." Id. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 
544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976), reu'd, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). Whether tribes retain 
criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are members of other tribes remains uncertain. F. 
COHEN, supra note 1, at 253 n.90. The General Crimes Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 
(1982), specifically reserves to the tribes jurisdiction over crimes committed by one In-
dian against another. The Indian Crimes Act of 1976, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. III 1985), 
establishes federal jurisdiction over 16 enumerated crimes. This is generally understood 
to eliminate tribal jurisdiction over those offenses, although such a conclusion is not re-
quired by a literal reading of the statute or by its legislative history. AIPRC TASK FORCE 
FouR, supra note 2, at 36-37. 
12. This Note will use the term "non-Indians" to include Indians who are not mem-
bers of the tribe whose court system is asserting jurisdiction. "Indians" refers to mem-
bers of the tribe asserting adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
13. The United States holds title to approximately 52.5 million acres of land in trust 
for Indian tribes and individuals. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 471. Tribal property is held 
in common for the benefit of all living tribal members. Id. at 472. Federal statutory 
restraints on the alienation of tribal land preserve the Indian land base. Id. at 509. From 
1887 to 1934, however, the tribal land base was seriously depleted by federal allotment 
policy. The General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 
authorized allotment of reservation lands to individual Indians. Eventually, a large por-
tion of the allotted land was conveyed to non-Indians. Further allotment of Indian lands 
was prohibited by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified 
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Those reservations that 
were subject to allotment "frequently have 'a crazy patchwork quilt or checkerboard' 
pattern of land ownership: non-Indian lands held in fee patent, individual Indian allot-
ments held in trust, and tribal lands held in trust." AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra 
note 2, at 94. On some reservations, the majority of the land ownership and the popula-
tion within reservation boundaries is non-Indian. Id. at 94-95. For a more complete dis-
cussion of tribal property, see F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 471-574. 
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courts to claim and exercise broader jurisdiction1" make it neces-
sary to determine definitively the extent of tribal adjudicatory 
authority where non-Indian litigants are involved. 
This Note examines the issue of tribal court jurisdiction over 
cases in which both Indians and non-Indians are parties and dis-
cusses the Supreme Court's most recent statement on the issue. 
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of In-
dians, 111 an Indian minor brought a personal injury action in 
Crow Tribal Court16 against a Montana school district operating 
a school on state-owned land within the Crow Reservation. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the tribal court itself should first 
determine whether it has the power to exercise civil subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction over non-Indian property owners in a tort case.17 
Defendants contesting tribal court jurisdiction can seek federal 
review of the tribal exercise of jurisdiction in district court only 
after exhausting the remedies available in the tribal court 
system.18 
Part I of this Note sets out the relationship between the tribes 
and the federal government and traces the development of the 
tribal court systems. Part II discusses the National Farmers 
Union case and critiques the Supreme Court opinion. Part III 
proposes a plan for formal federal recognition of individual 
tribes' civil jurisdiction over cases in various subject-matter ar-
eas in which both non-Indians and Indians are parties. Such a 
program would end uncertainty over the scope of tribal court 
civil jurisdiction and secure to the tribes the authority to adjudi-
cate reservation-based civil disputes, thus aiding in the fulfill-
ment of the federal policy of strengthening tribal government. 
I. THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP AND INDIAN TRIBAL 
COURTS 
The United States and the Indian tribes enjoy a unique rela-
tionship. Although Indian tribes possess attributes of sover-
eignty that, as a general rule, exempt them from state laws and 
14. Recently, tribes have been more willing to assert jurisdiction over cases involving 
non-Indians. NATIONAL AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES Ass'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 
31, 47 (1978) [hereinafter INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE]. 
15. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
16. Sage v. Lodge Grass School Dist., 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training 
Program) 6019 (Crow Trib. Ct. 1982). 
17. 471 U.S. at 856. 
18. Id. at 856-57. 
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state regulation, the tribes are subject to the plenary authority 
of the federal government. The exercise of the United States' 
power, however, is limited by the federal government's fiduciary 
duties toward the tribes. As part of its fiduciary responsibility, 
the federal government has sought to guarantee to tribes the ad-
ministration of justice on reservation lands-a crucial element of 
tribal self-government. 
A. Tribal Sovereignty 
The proper starting point for any discussion or decision with 
respect to Indian tribes and the jurisdiction they possess is the 
concept of tribal sovereignty.19 Congress and the courts have 
recognized the sovereign status of Indian tribes from the earliest 
days of the Republic.20 The most important judicial statement 
on this subject was made by the Supreme Court in Worcester v. 
Georgia. 21 In holding that state law could have no effect on 
Cherokee lands in Georgia,22 Chief Justice John Marshall found 
that Indian tribes were "distinct, independent political commu-
nities."23 European nations, and later the United States, entered 
into treaties with the Indians, in recognition of "their title to 
self-government. "24 
Although respect for tribal sovereignty has waned at times 
with vacillations in the federal government's Indian policy,26 it 
has nonetheless survived and has received increasing support 
from the federal government since the 196O's. The Indian Self-
19. 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6; at 101; AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra 
note 2, at 1. 
20. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 233; see also 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 
100 ("The status of Indian tribes as sovereigns, or governments, has been uniformly rec-
ognized by Congress and the courts from prerevolutionary days through the present."). 
21. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
22. Id. at 561 ("The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community, occupying its own 
territory ... in which the laws of Georgia can have no force .... "). 
23. Id. at 559. 
24. Id. at 560. 
25. 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
plenary authority of Congress in relation to tribal sovereignty as Congress began 
to exercise its broad power to deal with Indian affairs. . . . 
With passage of the Curtis Act of 1898 and the abolishment of the Indian 
Territory, tribal government lapsed into a period of dormancy. The policy trend 
toward destruction of tribal government was reversed in 1934 with passage of 
the Indian Reorganization Act. 
1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 101 (citations omitted). 
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Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 197526 recog-
nized "the obligation of the United States to respond to the 
strong expression of the Indian people for self-determination"27 
by providing a mechanism whereby the tribes themselves could 
administer many federal programs on the reservations.28 The 
Supreme Court has also reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the 
concept of tribal sovereignty.29 Finally, the executive branch has 
sought to strengthen tribal sovereignty. 30 President Reagan has 
stated that he wishes "to restore tribal governments to their 
rightful place among the governments of this nation and to en-
able tribal governments . . . to resume control over their own 
affairs. "31 
B. Federal Authority over the Tribes 
Although Worcester v. Georgia32 held that Indian tribes are 
not subject to state law within the reservation and have exclu-
sive authority within their territorial boundaries,33 later cases 
have made it clear that the tribes are subject to the superior 
authority of the United States. 34 Thus, although the states gen-
erally cannot regulate affairs on reservations, the United States 
26. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
27. Id. § 450a(a). 
28. Id. §§ 450a, 450f, 450g. For citations of other important Indian legislation of the 
1970's, see M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 88-89 (2d ed. 1983). 
29. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (upholding the con-
gressional power to delegate authority to a tribal council to regulate distribution of alco-
holic beverages on the reservation and stating that "Indian tribes are unique aggrega-
tions possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory"). 
30. "In 1970 President Nixon served notice in a message to Congress that he in-
tended to steer a policy course designed to strengthen tribal sovereignty, transfer control 
of Indian programs from federal to tribal governments, restore and protect the Indian 
land base, and forever declare an end to involuntary termination." M. PRICE & R. CLIN-
TON, supra note 28, at 88 (citing MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1970)). 
31. President's American Indian Policy Statement, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 98, 
101 (Jan. 24, 1983). More recently, in proclaiming American Indian Week, 1986, Presi-
dent Reagan stated: "We look to the future with the expectation of even stronger tribal 
governments and lessened Federal control over tribal government affairs. We look to a 
future of development of economic independence and self-sufficiency, and an enhanced 
government-to-government relationship that will allow greater Indian control of Indian 
resources." 51 Fed. Reg. 42,815 (1986). 
32. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
33. Id. at 557. 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327 (1978) ("It is true that in 
the exercise of the powers of self-government, as in all other matters, the Navajo Tribe, 
like all Indian tribes, remains subject to ultimate federal control."). 
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can. 811 Federal power over Indian affairs is in fact often described 
as "plenary."36 In construing the scope of this power, the Su-
preme Court has relied primarily on the Indian Commerce 
Clause,37 the Treaty Clause,38 and the Supremacy Clause39 as 
sources of broad federal power over Indian affairs. 40 Aside from 
the Indian Commerce Clause, the Constitution mentions Indians 
explicitly only in article 141 and in the fourteenth amendment,42 
which exclude "Indians not taxed" from the count for determin-
ing apportionment of taxes and representatives to Congress. 
Federal authority over the tribes has also been supported by 
congressional power to spend money for the "general Welfare of 
the United States,"'3 the Necessary and Proper Clause," the 
Property Clause,411 and the war powers of Congress.46 The combi-
nation of these specific constitutional provisions constitutes a 
single power over Indian aff airs47 in the hands of the federal 
government. 
35. 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 100: 
While the opinion in Worcester v. Georgia holds that Indian tribes are not 
subject to state law, later cases make it clear that Indian tribal sovereignty, or 
self-government, is subject to the superior legislative authority of Congress. To 
put it another way, Georgia could not regulate affairs on the Cherokee reserva-
tion, but the United States could. 
36. Id. at 101; F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 207. 
37. Congress is authorized to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Cases noting 
Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause include United States v. Antelope, 
430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977), and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 
164, 172 n.7 (1973). 
38. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The national government is granted exclusive au-
thority to enter into treaties. Congress ratified many treaties with the Indians until 1871 
and has enacted statutes relating to them. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 152-153, 157-158 (1982) 
(regulating the disposition of proceeds of land ceded to the United States by Indian 
treaties). 
39. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. Valid exercises of federal constitutional power over In-
dian affairs are the "supreme Law of the Land" and supersede conflicting state constitu-
tional and statutory provisions. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 211. 
40. These three constitutional clauses are the ones that courts most often refer to in 
discussing the source of federal power over Indian affairs. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 211. 
41. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
42. Id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
43. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 106; 
F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 210 n.21 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974)). 
44. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 211 n.24 (citing 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)). 
45. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. For a discussion of congressional power over Indian 
affairs under the Property Clause, see F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 209-10. 
46. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, els. 1, 11-12, 15-17. Congress' war powers "underlay much 
of the federal exercise of authority over Indians during the early history of the Repub-
lic." F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 210. 
47. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 211. 
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C. The Federal Trust Responsibility 
Although federal authority over the tribes has been described 
as "plenary,"'8 the Supreme Court has recognized limitations on 
the exercise of this authority. 49 These limitations stem from the 
Constitution itself,6° respect for Indian sovereignty,'11 and the 
special trust relationship between the United States and the 
tribes. 
Chief Justice Marshall first explained the trust relationship in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.62 Noting that "the relation of the 
Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal 
distinctions which exist [nowhere] else,"113 Marshall described 
their relationship with the United States as that of a ward and 
guardian.114 As "domestic dependent nations,"1111 the Indian tribes 
rely on the federal government for protection.116 
Marshall underscored this protective relationship in Worces-
ter v. Georgia. 117 He stated that the United States had assumed 
the role of providing protection to the Indians.118 This did not, 
however, extinguish the tribes' status as sovereign govern-
ments.119 Instead, the United States assumed a fiduciary obliga-
tion to guarantee the security and integrity of the tribes as inde-
pendent political communities in exchange for their friendliness 
48. Felix Cohen summarized the meaning of Congress' "plenary" power over the In-
dians as follows: "[A)lthough in practice Congress leaves much governing authority to 
the tribes, federal power over Indians is 'plenary' in the sense that in Indian matters 
Congress can exercise broad police power, rather than only the powers of a limited gov-
ernment with specifically enumerated powers." Id. at 220. "Plenary" is thus not synony-
mous with "absolute" or "total," but rather "appears to be used as a summary of the 
congressional powers over Indians." Id. at 219. 
49. For a discussion of the limitations on the exercise of federal power, see id. at 217-
28. 
50. See id. at 217-20. 
51. See Note, A Proposal for Extension of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
to Indian-Owned Businesses on Reservations, 18 U. Mien. J.L. REF. 473, 482 (1985). 
52. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
53. Id. at 16. 
54. Id. at 17. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
58. Id. at 552. 
59. 
[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not 
surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by associating with a 
stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its 
safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without strip-
ping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state. 
Id. at 560-61. 
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to the United States.80 The Supreme Court has stated that the 
federal government's exercise of its authority over Indians must 
be rationally related to the fulfillment of this obligation81 and 
"based on a determination that the Indians will be protected."82 
D. The Development of Tribal Courts 
One of the traditional attributes of sovereignty that the 
United States, as fiduciary and guardian, has undertaken to 
guarantee to the tribes is adjudicatory authority. Such authority 
over disputes within its territory is a crucial element of any sov-
ereign's self-government.83 The Indian tribes exercised this au-
thority, until the late nineteenth century, in keeping with tradi-
tional mechanisms of tribal justice, which differed from tribe to 
tribe as well as differing from "Western" systems of justice. 84 
Tribal and civil jurisdiction were exclusive within the tribe's ter-
ritory; this still remains the case, except where the federal gov-
ernment or actions of the tribes have imposed limitations.86 Ad-
60. "The United States assumed a fiduciary obligation, insuring the tribes' continu-
ing integrity as self-governing entities within certain territory." F. COHEN, supra note 1, 
at 234. One manifestation of the United States' fiduciary obligation is the federal govern-
ment's holding title to land within reservation boundaries in trust for the tribe or, in 
some cases, individuals. See supra note 13. The trust also encompasses the obligation to 
provide related services and to take actions necessary to protect self-government. 1 
AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 105. 
61. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Supreme Court concluded that 
statutes conferring upon tribal Indians a preference for employment in the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs did not violate the fifth amendment. "As long as the special treatment can 
be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, 
such legislative judgments will not be disturbed." Id. at 555. 
62. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 221. The trust obligation also constrains federal power 
procedurally. In recognition of the federal trust responsibility, the courts have developed 
canons to construe federal action when possible as protecting Indian rights. The primary 
canons were first developed in treaty cases and require "that treaties be liberally con-
strued to favor Indians, that ambiguous expressions in treaties must be resolved in favor 
of the Indians, and that treaties should be construed as the Indians would have under-
stood them." Id. at 222 (footnotes omitted); see also Note, The Canons of Indian Treaty 
and Statutory Construction: A Proposal for Codification, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 681 
(1984). 
63. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
64. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 332. The tribes generally "utilized governing modes 
premised upon communal property concepts and administered on the basis of oral cus-
toms." AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM INC., JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
164 (1980) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY); see also AIPRC TASK FoRCE FouR, 
supra note 2, at 121. 
65. See 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 114-17; F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 
332. 
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judicatory authority has thus historically been a strong element 
of tribal sovereignty. 
Eventually the traditional tribal legal systems declined as a 
result of dealings with European nations and the United 
States. 66 The federal government, in recognition of the impor-
tance of having adequate reservation institutions for adjudica-
tion of disputes, established Courts of Indian Offenses, begin-
ning in 1883.67 By 1890, Courts of Indian Offenses operated at 
two-thirds of reservation agencies.66 
During the 1930's, the federal government decided to en-
courage the Indian tribes to develop their governments. Im-
provement of reservation court systems was recognized as a cru-
cial element in revitalizing tribal governmental authority. Under 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,69 tribes were to organize 
their own governments by adopting constitutions and bylaws. 70 
In 1935, Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier promul-
gated a revised Code of Indian Tribal Offenses for the Courts of 
Indian Offenses. 71 The new Code expressly set out the right of 
the tribes to replace the Courts of Indian Offenses and the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Code with their own courts and 
66. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 332-33. There were some exceptions to this general 
decline in traditional legal systems. At the time the Courts of Indian Offenses, see infra 
notes 67-68 and accompanying text, were being developed, the Five Civilized Tribes 
(Choctaw, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole), the New York Indians, the 
Osage, the Pueblos, and the Eastern Cherokees all had their own justice systems. AIPRC 
TASK FORCE FouR, supra note 2, at 123 n.7. The Cherokees established a central govern-
ment incorporating Anglo-American institutions. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 332 n.4. 
67. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 333. Aside from filling a void perceived in the provi-
sion of law and order on reservations where traditional legal systems had declined, these 
courts were also intended as a competing center of authority to reduce the remaining 
power of traditional tribal leaders. Id. 
68. AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra note 2, at 123; see also JUSTICE IN INDIAN CouN-
TRY, supra note 64, at 165 (noting widespread tribal resistance to the Courts of Indian 
Offenses). Congress never expressly authorized the courts, but began funding them in 
1888. F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 333 n.15. The validity of the courts was sustained in 
United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888). See infra notes 163-65 and accompany-
ing text. 
69. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982 & Supp. 
III 1985)). For a discussion of the Indian Reorganization Act, see Comment, Tribal Self-
Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972). 
70. 25 u.s.c. § 476 (1982). 
71. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 333; see 25 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1986). A Code of Indian 
Offenses was first set out in regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior in 1884. 
JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 64, at 165. The 1935 revised Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) Code, with minor changes, is still in force. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 333. 
Since publication of the 1935 BIA Code in the Code of Federal Regulations, Courts of 
Indian Offenses have also been called "CFR courts." JusTJCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra 
note 64, at 167 n.40. Changes in the BIA Code have recently been proposed. See 50 Fed. 
Reg. 43,235 (1985); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 400 (1986) (extending comment period). 
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codes. 72 Tribal approval was required for appointments of judges 
to the remaining Courts of Indian Offenses. 73 
Since 1935, most tribes have shown their interest in exercising 
their adjudicatory authority by developing their own court sys-
tems and adopting judicial codes. 74 Almost all of the tribes, how-
ever, chose to base their codes and judicial systems at least in 
part on the BIA Code and courts.711 Consequently, most tribes 
have courts and codes based on Anglo-American concepts of 
civil and criminal law.76 Although the tribal court systems are 
thus not truly "Indian" legal systems, what is most significant 
about them is that they are operated by the tribes themselves 
and provide for tribal administration of justice on the 
reservation. 
Some tribal court systems further reflect the influence of 
the BIA Code by limiting their civil jurisdiction to that of 
the Courts of Indian Offenses: "all suits wherein the defendant 
is a member of the tribe or tribes within their jurisdiction, 
and . . . all other suits between members and nonmembers 
which are brought before the courts by stipulation of both 
parties."77 Federal courts,78 Congress,79 and the executive 
72. 25 C.F.R. § 11.l(e) (1986). 
73. Id. § 11.3(b). 
74. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 334; JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 64, at 171. 
Such courts are referred to as "tribal courts," in contrast to the remaining Courts of 
Indian Offenses, or CFR courts. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 11. 
75. F. COHEN, supra note I, at 334; INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 
11. Only a very few tribes, principally the Pueblos of New Mexico, maintain traditional 
systems of justice based on unwritten customs. Id.; JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra 
note 64, at 170. Indian courts thus fall into three categories: "tribal courts," operating 
under constitutions and codes adopted by the tribes; "CFR courts," the remaining 
Courts of Indian Offenses established pursuant to provisions of the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations; and "traditional courts," customary judicial institutions like those maintained 
by the Pueblo tribes in New Mexico, which little resemble Anglo-American models. Id. at 
170-71. A discussion of the CFR courts and traditional courts is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
76. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 334. 
77. 25 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1986); see also Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Res-
ervation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 206, 221. 
78. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), the Supreme Court stated: 
"Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive 
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both In-
dians and non-Indians." Id. at 65. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the Supreme 
Court recognized exclusive tribal court jurisdiction in an action brought by a non-Indian 
against an Indian upon a reservation-based debt. The Court stated: "It is immaterial 
that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an 
Indian took place there. . .. The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the au-
thority of Indian governments over their reservations." Id. at 223. 
79. Congress. has never enacted general legislation to provide a federal or state forum 
for civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians on the reservation. In 1953, Congress 
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branch,80 however, have acknowledged that the tribes do not 
have to limit their jurisdiction to such an extent, and have rec-
ognized the validity of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over civil 
cases arising on the reservation in which non-Indians as well as 
Indians are parties. Some tribes have elected to extend tribal 
court jurisdiction over all civil cases arising within the reserva-
tion.81 Recently, more tribes have decided to expand the exercise 
of their jurisdiction over civil cases involving non-Indians.82 
Because of its broad authority over Indian affairs, Congress 
. could statutorily define the limits of the civil jurisdiction of tri-
bal, state, and federal courts in reservation-based disputes, as it 
has done to some extent in the area of criminal jurisdiction,83 
and thus end uncertainty over whether tribes have the authority 
to exercise jurisdiction over reservation-based civil cases that in-
volve both Indians and non-Indians. It has declined to do so, 
however, and has, thus far, left resolution of the issue to the 
courts. The Supreme Court, as well, has declined to state an 
across-the-board rule. The tribes and their members, as well as 
any individuals or entities that have dealings with the reserva-
tions and their residents, are thus faced with uncertainty as to 
whether tribal court exercises of jurisdiction will be respected or 
struck down by federal courts. This situation discourages the 
full development of tribal self-government and tribal econo-
mies, 84 thus undercutting congressional and executive policy to-
ward the tribes. 
provided for state civil and criminal judicial jurisdiction on some reservations and for 
voluntary assumptions by states of jurisdiction over other reservations. Act of Aug. 15, 
1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982) (criminal) and 
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (civil)). After 1968, states could no longer 
assume jurisdiction without tribal consent. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
Apparently, the 1953 Act does not deprive tribal courts on affected reservations of con-
current civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 254 n.95. Furthermore, 
Indian treaties did not provide for tribal relinquishment of civil jurisdiction over causes 
of action involving non-Indians. Id. at 254. 
80. "An Indian tribe may exercise a complete jurisdiction over its members and 
within the limits of the reservation, subordinate only to the expressed limitations of 
Federal law." Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solie. Interior 445, 475 (1934) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). This statement seems to encompass tribal adjudicatory juris-
diction over all causes of action arising within reservation boundaries. 
81. See, e.g., infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra note 11. 
84. See generally Oversight of Economic Development on Indian Reservations: 
Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
As Senator William Cohen stated, "The existence of a reliable tribal government, how-
ever, is critical to the development of the reservation. Without that, private sector inter-
228 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:1 
II. NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INSURANCE Cos. v. CRow TRIBE 
OF INDIANS 
In National Farmers Union, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
tribal sovereignty by requiring exhaustion of tribal court reme-
dies before a federal district court can review tribal assertions of 
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. This reaffirmation is undermined, 
however, by the establishment of a layer of federal court review 
above the tribal court system. Because of this judicial interfer-
ence with the federal policy of strengthening tribal self-govern-
ment, the decision does not provide a wholly satisfactory ap-
proach to the jurisdictional issue. 
A. The National Farmers Union Decision 
Leroy Sage, a member of the Crow Tribe and a student at 
Lodge Grass Elementary School on the Crow Reservation, was 
struck by a motorcycle on school grounds after returning from a 
school outing, and sustained severe injuries to his leg.8 ~ The 
child and his guardian brought a negligence suit against the 
school district in Crow Tribal Court, which the tribe had given 
authority to exercise jurisdiction "over all civil causes of action 
arising within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reser-
vation. "88 Process was served on the chairman of the school 
board, but the school district did not answer the complaint or 
appear in tribal court to contest jurisdiction. The tribal court 
found the school district negligent under Montana law87 and en-
ests will be reluctant to enter into compacts concerning the communal property of the 
tribe." Id. at 2. One tribal spokesman stressed that "[s)trong and effective government 
can develop and carry out community-determined programs supportive of balanced so-
cial and economic growth, and can establish a climate conducive to private sector invest-
ment, markets, and job opportunities for tribal economies." Id. at 23 (statement of Harry 
Earl, Governor, Laguna Pueblo, and Chairman, CERT Economic Development Commit-
tee). Tribal courts can play an important role in economic development if they are recog-
nized as the appropriate forum for settling disputes between tribal members and outside 
investors and developers. 
85. Sage v. Lodge Grass School Dist., 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training 
Program) 6019, 6019 (Crow Trib. Ct. 1982). 
86. Caow TRIB. CooE § 3-2-205, quoted in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow 
Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Mont. 1983). Jurisdiction over the defendant 
school district was based on the fact that it "resides, operates, and transacts business 
within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Reservation." Sage, 10 Indian L. Rep. at 
6019. 
87. 10 Indian L. Rep. at 6019. 
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tered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount 
of $153,010.88 
When the school district received notice of the default judg-
ment, it notified its insurer, National Farmers Union Insurance 
(National), of the suit. Neither the school district nor National 
contested the default judgment in tribal court or appealed to the 
Crow Tribal Court of Appeals. 89 Instead of pursuing these tribal 
remedies, National and the school district obtained a temporary 
restraining order from the United States District Court for the 
District of Montana prohibiting Sage from enforcing his default 
judgment.90 They also filed suit against the Crow Tribe,91 seek-
ing a permanent injunction against enforcement of the tribal 
court judgment. 
The district court determined that it had jurisdiction over the 
suit under 28 U.S.C. § 133192 "to determine whether the Tribal 
Court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction,"93 and 
ruled that National's claim arose under federal common law.94 
The district court held that the Crow Tribal Court did not have 
jurisdiction over the tort claim because such jurisdiction was not 
delegated to the tribe by statute or treaty,911 and is not a re-
tained element of inherent sovereignty.96 The court noted that, 
88. Id. at 6019-20. 
89. CROW TRIB. R. C1v. P. 17; Caow TRIB. CooE § 31-1-103; Caow TRIB. R. APP. P. 2, 
quoted in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 
1321 (9th Cir. 1984). 
90. See 736 F.2d at 1321-22. 
91. Also named in the suit as defendants were the Tribal Council, the Tribal Court, 
judges of the Court, and the Chairman of the Tribal Council. National Farmers Union 
Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 848 (1985). Leroy Sage and his guardian 
were later added as parties defendant. Id.; see also 736 F.2d at 1322 n.l. 
92. Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over "civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). 
93. 560 F. Supp. 213, 214 (D. Mont. 1983). -
94. The court stated, 
·,, The jurisdictional question . . . places at issue the extent of tribal court civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians as developed by the Supreme Court in Montana v. 
United States-developments that are not drawn from any specific statute or 
treaty, but raise the overriding federal interest in determining the extent of tri-
bal sovereignty and therefore form a part of federal common law. 
Id. at 214-15 (citation omitted). 
95. Id. at 215, 216. 
96. Id. at 216-17. In examining this second possible basis for tribal court jurisdiction, 
the court assumed that the tribe's adjudicatory and regulatory authority must be coex-
tensive-an assumption that the Court of Appeals found untenable. 736 F.2d at 1322 n.3. 
Having made this assumption, the district court analyzed the issue according to the lan-
guage set out in a case dealing with tribal regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fish-
ing, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). The court interpreted Montana as 
providing that a tribe may regulate activities of a non-Indian on non-Indian land within 
the reservation only where (1) the non-Indian has entered consensual relationships with 
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because the tribe did not have power to extend jurisdiction over 
the suit and because the tort claim does not present grounds for 
federal jurisdiction, the claim belonged in state court. 97 The 
court issued a permanent injunction against execution of the tri-
bal court judgment. 98 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not reach the 
merits of National's challenge to tribal court jurisdiction because 
it concluded that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was 
not supported by any constitutional, statutory, or common law 
ground. The Ninth Circuit found that National's equal protec-
tion and due process claims cannot arise under the Constitution 
because tribes are not constrained by the fourteenth amend-
ment. 99 Furthermore, although tribes are bound by the Indian 
Civil Rights Act to exercise their jurisdiction in a manner consis-
tent with due process and equal protection, 10° Congress has lim-
ited federal court review of claimed violations of the Act to the 
single remedy of the writ of habeas corpus.101 Finally, the court 
concluded that recognizing a common law cause of action for al-
leged abuse of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction would be contrary 
the tribe or its members, or (2) where the conduct of the non-Indian "threatens or has 
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or wel-
fare of the tribe." 560 F. Supp. at 216 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66). The court 
held that the first exception did not apply because a personal injury, rather than a con-
sensual arrangement, was at the center of the dispute. Id. This seems to be a misinter-
pretation of Montana, which arguably concludes that the tribe may regulate all activities 
of non-Indians who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members-like 
the school district here-not just activities related to specific contracts or leases: "A tribe 
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers 
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. The court 
found that the second exception did not apply because the conduct in question only 
affected the health and welfare of an individual rather than the tribe. 560 F. Supp. at 
217. This ignores the fact that the allegedly hazardous conditions were a threat to all 
tribal members who might cross the schoolyard. See Sage v. Lodge Grass School Dist., 10 
Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6019, 6019 (Crow Trib. Ct. 1982). 
97. 560 F. Supp. at 218. 
98. Id. 
99. 736 F.2d at 1322. The court cited R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing 
Authority, 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985), and 
Trans-Canada Enterprises v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476-77 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
100. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982). Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982), imposed many Bill of Rights provisions on Indian tribes. It 
also restricted penalties that tribal courts can impose in criminal cases by stating that 
tribal courts can "in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or 
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or 
both." Id. § 1302(7). 
101. 736 F.2d at 1323. This was the holding of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49, 66-70 (1977). See infra note 137. 
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to Congress' purposeful restriction of federal court interference 
with tribal court proceedings to the review of petitions for 
habeas corpus. 102 The court added that the tribal court is the 
proper forum to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction, at 
least in tl}.e first instance.103 
Judge Wright dissented in part and concurred in part. Hear-
gued that the plaintiff had stated a federal common law cause of 
action involving a substantial federal question over which the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.104 He concluded, however, that plaintiffs should be re-
quired to exhaust remedies available in the tribal court system 
before seeking federal intervention. 1011 
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court holding 
that federal district courts have jurisdiction over a case such as 
National's. Whether a tribe retains jurisdiction over reservation-
based disputes that involve non-Indians is a federal question 
and must be answered by reference to federal law.106 The district 
court may determine under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 whether a tribal 
court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction.107 
The Supreme Court distinguished Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe, 108 which held that tribal courts do not have inherent 
criminal jurisdiction to try non-Indians for offenses committed 
on the reservation. 109 First, there is no legislation giving the fed-
102. 736 F.2d at 1323; see also infra note 137. 
103. Id. at 1324. 
104. Id. at 1324, 1325. 
105. Id. at 1326. 
106. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 
(1985). 
107. Id. at 853. 
108. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
109. In his opinion for the Court in Oliphant, Justice Rehnquist noted what he found 
to be a "commonly shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch and the lower 
federal courts" that tribal courts lack the power to try non-Indians. Id. at 206. He con-
cluded that Indian courts lack such jurisdiction absent an affirmative delegation by Con-
gress, id. at 208, because "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United 
States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens 
of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress." Id. at 210. He recog-
nized that Indian tribal courts today "resemble in many respects their state counter-
parts" and that non-Indian crime is prevalent on reservations, but concluded that these 
are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether to authorize jurisdiction. 
Id. at 211-12. 
In his dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger joined, Justice Marshall stated 
his view that "[i]n the absence of affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute, ... Indian 
tribes enjoy as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the right to try and pun-
ish all persons who commit offenses against tribal law within the reservation." Id. at 212. 
For one discussion of the Oliphant decision that questions the accuracy of Justice 
Rehnquist's historical and textual analysis, see M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 28, at 
275-76. 
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eral courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between Indians and 
non-Indians, as there is for criminal matters. 110 Second, princi-
ples governing civil jurisdiction on reservations and rules dealing 
with tribal criminal jurisdiction have developed in a markedly 
different way. m 
Having decided against extending Oliphant, the Court 
adopted the exhaustion requirement suggested by Judge 
Wright. 112 Determination of 
the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction 
will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, 
the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, 
divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of rel-
evant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in 
treaties · and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial 
decisions. 113 
Requiring that this examination be conducted in the first in-
stance in the tribal court itself, the Court noted, recognizes Con-
gress' commitment to supporting tribal self-government and 
self-determination, serves the orderly administration of justice 
by allowing development of a full record in the tribal court, en-
courages tribal courts to explain the precise basis for exercising 
jurisdiction, and provides other courts with the benefit of the 
tribal court's expertise in the event of further judicial review. 11" 
B. The Self-Defeating Rationale of National Farmers Union 
To a certain extent, the Supreme Court's decision is quite 
favorable to the interests of the tribes. By requiring exhaustion 
of tribal remedies, the decision reaffirms the sovereignty of the 
tribes and their retention of inherent powers of self-govern-
ment. 1111 It reiterates the basic principle that tribal court juris-
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. III 1985); see supra note 11. 
111. 471 U.S. at 854 n.16, 855 n.17. Congress has never enacted general legislation to 
establish a federal or state forum for adjudicating civil disputes between Indians and 
non-Indians on reservations. Furthermore, Indian treaties did not provide for tribal re-
linquishment of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, although they sometimes did require 
tribes to surrender non-Indian criminal suspects to federal or state authorities. Id. at 855 
n.17; see also supra note 11. 
112. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. 
113. 471 U.S. at 855-56 (footnotes omitted). 
114. Id. at 856-57. 
115. Id. at 856. 
~ 
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diction is an element of tribal sovereignty that survives intact 
unless altered by federal law. 116 The decision thus indicates con-
tinuing judicial respect for the sovereignty of Indian tribes. 
The Supreme Court decision also recognizes the commitment 
of Congress to a policy of supporting tribal self-determination 
and self-government.117 An important element of self-determina-
tion and self-government is exercising authority over disputes 
that arise within the territorial boundaries of the reservation. 
The tribe has a strong interest in protecting the interests of tri-
bal members and in governing both Indian and non-Indian be-
havior on the reservation. 118 Also, as a governmental body, the 
tribe has a strong interest in providing a forum for the peaceful 
resolution of disputes arising on the reservation, as well as an 
obligation to provide such a forum. 119 Affording the tribal court 
the first opportunity to evaluate the basis for a challenge to its 
jurisdiction recognizes tribal interests and obligations and fur-
thers congressional policy regarding tribal governments. 
The Supreme Court's decision ensures that initial proceedings 
will occur within the court system most able to give the litigants 
quick access to a judicial forum. 120 Most Indian reservations are 
located in rural areas without ready access to federal or state 
courts. 121 If any county courts are available nearby, they are 
likely to be unsympathetic to or even hostile toward Indian liti-
gants. 122 Tribal courts provide a forum within the territory in 
which the dispute arose and are thus convenient for evidentiary 
purposes, and will often be the forum most convenient to the 
litigants, especially if they all live on or near the reservation. 
Because Indian tribal court proceedings and Indian tribal 
codes123 are largely modeled on Anglo-American models, and be-
cause proceedings are generally conducted in English, 12" non-In-
dian litigants should not find any marked contrast between the 
tribal court system and local, state, and federal courts, 1211 other 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Brief for Respondents, National Farmers Union (No. 84-320); see Canby, supra 
note 77, at 218-19. 
119. Brief for Respondents, supra note 118. 
120. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 89. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 79. By comparison, a survey of Indians and non-Indians indicated that the 
only serious bias against non-Indians in tribal courts was that non-Indians were given 
heavier fines instead of jail sentences. Id. 
123. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
124. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 68. 
125. Id. at 44, 61. 
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than perhaps the lower cost of litigation in the tribal court.128 As 
the Supreme Court noted, allowing the development of a full 
record in the tribal court also promotes efficiency and the or-
derly administration of justice in the federal courts and gives the 
federal courts the benefit of tribal court expertise in the event of 
federal judicial review. 127 
Finally, and most importantly, the tribal court may be the 
only forum available to the litigants where there is no diversity 
between the parties and no federal question as the basis of the 
suit, and where jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising on 
the reservation has not been delegated to the state.128 In Na-
tional Farmers Union, for example, complete diversity of citi-
zenship did not exist so there was no diversity jurisdiction, and 
there was no federal question jurisdiction over the tort claim it-
self. The State of Montana has not obtained jurisdiction over 
civil causes of action arising within the Crow Reservation. Con-
sequently, the injured child and his guardian could turn only to 
the tribal court. 129 
Requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies also provides encour-
agement to tribal courts, which have endeavored to provide fair, 
efficient systems of justice using institutions and concepts of jus-
tice that were essentially foreign to the tribes and were initially 
thrust upon them. 130 Low levels of funding have inhibited the 
development of the tribal court systems, 131 as has the difficulty 
of receiving recognition of judgments by surrounding jurisdic-
tions. 132 To train the personnel needed to operate the system, 
programs were set up for tribal judges133 and for lawyers who 
will practice before the tribal courts. m Supreme Court defer-
ence to tribal jurisdiction necessarily increases the importance of 
tribal courts and their decisions,1311 recognizes their efforts to in-
126. One reason for the lower cost of litigation in tribal courts is the extensive use of 
lay advocates. See id. at 65. 
127. 471 U.S. at 856-57; see supra text accompanying note 114. 
128. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 342; Canby, supra note 77, at 220-23. Even if there is 
diversity of citizenship between the parties, if the case is one that could not have been 
litigated in state court, the federal court may refuse to exercise diversity jurisdiction. Id. 
at 219 (citing Hot Oil Serv. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966), and Littell v. Nakai, 344 
F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966)); see also supra note 79. 
129. Brief for Respondents, supra note 118. 
130. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
131. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 57. 
132. Id. at 80-81; AIPRC TASK FORCE FOUR, supra note 2, at 128; see also infra notes 
191-93 and accompanying text. 
133. AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra note 2, at 125, 127. 
134. Id. at 125. 
135. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 89. 
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stitute and maintain fair and efficient proceedings, and encour-
ages them to exercise fully the authority they possess and to 
continue to improve tribal court systems. 136 
On the other hand, although the Supreme Court's exhaustion 
of tribal remedies requirement is a reaffirmation of tribal sover-
eignty, providing for an appeal of questions of tribal court juris-
diction to federal district court tends to undercut the tribal sys-
tem and to make the exhaustion requirement seem like an 
empty gesture. In effect, a layer of federal court review is in-
serted above the tribal court system. This frustrates congres-
sional policy that discourages federal court interference with the 
tribal courts. 137 
The National Farmers Union decision also undermines pre-
sent tribal court jurisdiction by providing an opportunity for lit-
igants to contest tribal court jurisdiction over areas in which it is 
well-established.138 Federal and state courts have recognized ex-
clusive tribal jurisdiction over adoption proceedings139 and di-
vorce proceedings140 where the parties are Indians. Courts have 
also upheld tribal jurisdiction over suits brought by non-Indians 
against Indians over debts, 141 torts, 142 and child custody.143 On 
the basis of the National Farmers Union decision, litigants may 
136. "Federal judicial deference means that Indian courts must respond to demands 
for interpretations of tribal law, review of administrative decisions, and determinations 
of the legitimacy of specific tribal actions. Consequently, more judicial business is indi-
cated .... " Id. 
137. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), for example, the Su-
preme Court stated that the Indian Civil Rights Act "was generally understood to au-
thorize federal judicial review of tribal actions only through the habeas corpus provisions 
of § 1303." Id. at 70. The Court noted further that this general understanding on the 
part of Congress, coupled with "Congress' rejection of proposals that clearly would have 
authorized causes of action other than habeas corpus, persuade us that Congress, aware 
of the intrusive effect of federal judicial review upon tribal self-government, intended to 
create only a limited mechanism for such review." Id. 
138. As Felix Cohen has stated, "Tribal authority over cases involving non-Indians is 
well established in some circumstances and may exist in others." F. COHEN, supra note 1, 
at 342. 
139. Id. (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976)). 
140. Id. (citing Whyte v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), cert. 
denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960)). 
141. Id. (citing Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217 (1959); Hot Oil Serv. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966)). 
142. Id. (citing Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974); Enriquez v. 
Superior Court, 115 Ariz. 342, 565 P.2d 522 (1977); Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 
(N.D. 1975); Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1975)). 
143. Id. (citing Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 
1973); Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333,347 A.2d 228 (1975); In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 
2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976)). The results of these cases are codified in the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 
171. 
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contest tribal jurisdiction over these areas by arguing that tribal 
jurisdiction must be reexamined in accordance with the analysis 
suggested by the decision.144 State court decisions on jurisdiction 
may be especially vulnerable to attack because of the National 
Farmers Union holding that the extent of tribal jurisdiction is a 
federal question to be examined by federal district courts.1411 Lit-
igants may also, however, attack federal court tribal jurisdiction 
decisions for not being based on the National Farmers Union 
analysis. The decision thus creates greater uncertainty about tri-
bal court jurisdiction when civil cases involve non-Indians. Tri-
bal courts will have to deal with the uncertainty of not knowing 
whether an exercise of jurisdiction will be simply a waste of time 
and limited resources. 
The opportunity to contest tribal court jurisdiction in federal 
court also invites abuse. Litigants who object to the jurisd1ction 
of the tribal court are unlikely to pursue their objection if they 
are satisfied with the result of the litig~tion in tribal court. Only 
if they object to the decision on the merits will they be likely to 
challenge jurisdiction in federal court. This amounts to an at-
tack on the merits of the tribal court decision and could further 
undermine tribal authority. Such a result is contrary to Con-
gress' and the executive branch's intent to strengthen tribal gov-
ernment, 146 of which the courts are an important element. 
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The Department of the Interior has broad authority over In-
dian affairs, which has been held to include the power to set up 
courts on Indian reservations and prescribe their jurisdiction.147 
The Department should establish a mechanism whereby tribes 
could petition for formal recognition of jurisdiction over all res-
ervation-based civil causes of action in various subject areas. 
Once formally recognized by the federal government, such juris-
diction should be respected by the courts, thus providing greater 
certainty over tribal jurisdiction and strengthening the tribal 
court systems. 
144. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
147. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. 
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Retained tribal sovereignty148 and the traditional powers of 
any sovereign to govern disputes arising within its territory149 
provide strong support for the exercise of tribal court jurisdic-
tion over cases arising on the reservation that involve both Indi-
ans and non-Indians. Congressional and executive policy aimed 
at strengthening tribal government1110 in furtherance of the fed-
eral trust responsibility1111 and considerations of convenience and 
practicality buttress these principles. 1112 Establishing a mecha-
nism for formal federal recognition of tribal court civil jurisdic-
tion can result in greater certainty. 
Because tribal court systems differ from each other in both 
their ability1113 and their willingness1114 to assume jurisdiction 
over civil cases involving both Indians and non-Indians, recogni-
tion of tribal court jurisdiction should proceed on a tribe-by-
tribe basis. Similarly, because different tribal courts may wish to 
exercise jurisdiction over different subject matters, m formal rec-
ognition should also proceed on a subject-by-subject basis. The 
148. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, 
. supra note 6, at 113: "Jurisdiction is often a question of the specific geographic area 
which is covered by the sovereign powers of a given government." 
150. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text. 
153. Some tribal courts are unable to assert jurisdiction over cases involving Indians 
and non-Indians because the tribal constitution does not extend jurisdiction over non-
Indians. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 47-48, 101-02. The results of a 
1976 survey of ioo reservations conducted by the American Indian Lawyer Training Pro-
gram indicated that 39~,. of the tribes exerted jurisdiction over non-Indians and 46% 
were in the process of changing their laws to be able to assert such jurisdiction or wished 
to do so. Id. at 32. Also, a court may decide it is unable to exercise jurisdiction over a 
case because it considers the case too complicated. Id. at 47, 50. 
154. The 1976 American Indian Lawyer Training Program survey, see supra note 
153, indicated that 15% of the tribes did not wish to exert jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Id. at 32. 
155. For example, one area of jurisdiction which is of great importance to Indian 
tribes is child welfare. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 
(1982), see infra text accompanying note 171, was enacted to ensure that Indian tribes 
can be actively involved in Indian child welfare issues. Before the passage of the Act, 25-
35 ~,. of all Indian children were separated from their families for placement in foster 
homes, adoptive homes, or institutions. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978). 
Most decisions as to whether Indian children should be removed from their homes, and 
where they would be raised, were made by non-Indian authorities. See 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1901(4). The Act "changed the basis upon which state and federal agencies make deci-
sions affecting the custody of Indian children to one with a more conscientious regard for 
the rights of Indian tribes, parents and children." Oversight of the Indian Child Welfare 
Act: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian A/fairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
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ultimate goal of the recognition process is that interested tribes 
will exercise jurisdiction over all reservation-based civil cases in 
which both an Indian and a non-Indian are parties. This will 
further the long-term goal of developing tribal governments into 
fully operational sovereigns that exercise the same powers and 
shoulder the same responsibilities as other local governments. 156 
Congress could enact a statute to establish a procedure for 
formal federal recognition of tribal court civil jurisdiction. One 
could argue, however, that the executive department with au-
thority over Indian affairs, the Department of the Interior, al-
ready has the power to establish procedures for federal recogni-
tion of tribal court civil jurisdiction. Pursuant to its broad 
powers over Indian affairs, 167 Congress may restrict Indian tribal 
court jurisdiction, but congressional approval is not needed to 
give the tribes adjudicatory jurisdiction over civil cases arising 
within their territory. Tribes retain, as an element of their inher-
ent sovereignty, civil jurisdiction over all causes of action arising 
on the reservation, regardless of whether a non-Indian is in-
volved, provided that components of this jurisdiction are not 
limited by the federal government.168 Such limitations on juris-
diction must be explicitly stated in acts of Congress or 
treaties. 169 
The Department of the Interior, acting through the BIA, is 
the prime agent for ensuring that the federal government carries 
out the United States' "permanent obligation to protect and en-
hance Indian lands, resources, and tribal self-government."160 
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs has broad authority to man-
age "all Indian affairs and . . . all matters arising out of Indian 
relations."161 Pursuant to this authority, the BIA set up Courts 
of Indian Offenses on reservations.162 In a nineteenth century 
district court case, United States v. Clapox, 163 the court held 
118 (1980) (statement of Steven Unger, Executive Director, Association of Am. Indian 
Affairs, Inc.). 
Other areas in which tribes may be especially interested in asserting jurisdiction in 
cases involving both Indians and non-Indians include divorce proceedings, consumer 
debt actions, and torts. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text; see also infra 
note 187. 
156. 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 13. 
157. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, 
supra note 2, at 89. 
159. AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra note 2, at 89. 
160. 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 247. 
161. 25 u.s.c. § 2 (1982). 
162. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
163. 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888). 
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that the Department of the Interior has the authority to estab-
lish on a reservation a Court of Indian Offenses and "to specify 
the acts or conduct concerning which it shall have jurisdic-
tion. "164 The court recognized the power of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs to set up courts on reservations and to specify the 
extent of their jurisdiction.1611 Congress acknowledged the valid-
ity of the Commissioner's action by providing funding for the 
Courts of Indian Offenses, 166 which still exist today where they 
have not been replaced by tribal courts.167 Analogous to the au-
thority to establish courts on Indian reservations is the authority 
to recognize formally the extent of the tribal courts' jurisdic-
tion.168 Accordingly, the Department of the Interior, acting 
through the BIA, is the appropriate entity to assume the respon-
sibility for formally recognizing civil jurisdiction that is retained 
and claimed by Indian tribes. The exercise of BIA authority in 
this manner would support the federal government's policy of 
strengthening tribal government. 169 Such an assumption of re-
sponsibility is also quite consistent with the role of the BIA and 
the Department of the Interior in granting approval of other tri-
bal actions. 170 
The Department of the Interior already exercises responsibil-
ity for recognizing tribal court jurisdiction in one area. The In-
dian Child Welfare Act of 1978171 provides a mechanism 
whereby tribes that have become subject to state jurisdiction 
pursuant to any federal law112 may reassume exclusive jurisdic-
tion over child custody proceedings.173 Interested tribes must 
submit to the Secretary of the Interior a suitable plan for reas-
164. Id. at 577. 
165. The court based its conclusion on statutory authority given to the Secretary of 
the Interior to supervise public business relating to the Indians; to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs to manage all Indian affairs and matters arising out of Indian relations 
(now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)); and to the President to prescribe regulations to 
carry into effect acts relating to Indian affairs (now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 9 (1982)). Id. 
at 576-77. 
166. See supra note 68. 
167. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
168. See generally supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
170. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1982) (Contracts with Indian tribes or Indians); id. 
§ 396a (Leases of unallotted lands for mining purposes; duration of leases); id. § 397 
(Leases of lands for grazing or mining); id. § 476 (Organization of Indian tribes; constitu-
tion and bylaws; special election). 
171. 25 u.s.c. §§ 1901-1963 (1982). 
172. See supra note 79. 
173. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (1982). It has been made clear that tribes may reassume juris-
diction without relinquishing their legal arguments that they already had such jurisdic-
tion concurrently with the state. 44 Fed. Reg. 45,092 (1979) (modifying 25 C.F.R. § 13.1). 
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suming this jurisdiction.174 This petition for reassumption must 
include a description of the tribal court system, copies of tribal 
rules and procedures for the exercise of jurisdiction over child 
custody matters, and citations to the tribal constitutional provi-
sion authorizing tribal jurisdiction over child custody matters. 175 
Once a tribe has presented a plan for exercising jurisdiction over 
child welfare cases, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs re-
views the petition and approves it if: (1) the petition is com-
plete; (2) the tribal constitution authorizes such jurisdiction; (3) 
the tribal court appears able to exercise jurisdiction over Indian 
child custody matters in a manner consistent with due process 
and the other safeguards, patterned after the Bill of Rights, that 
are embodied in the Indian Civil Rights Act; (4) sufficient child 
care services will be available; and (5) the tribe has a procedure 
for clearly identifying persons who will be subject to the tribe's 
jurisdiction.176 The Assistant Secretary publishes a notice of ap-
proval of the petition in the Federal Register. 177 The notice 
must clearly define the territory subject to the reassumption of 
jurisdiction, and a copy of the notice must be sent to the tribe 
and to the attorney general, governor, and highest court of the 
state aff ected. 178 Several tribes have already reassumed child 
custody jurisdiction under this procedure.179 
If the Assistant Secretary does not approve the plan submit-
ted, the BIA must immediately send reasons for disapproval to 
174. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a) (1982). 
175. 25 C.F.R. § 13.ll(a) (1986). 
176. Id. § 13.12(a). 
177. Id. § 13.14(a)(3). 
178. Id. § 13.14(b). 
179. See Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child 
Custody Proceedings by the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,337 (1982); 
Receipt and Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child 
Custody Proceedings by the Passamaquoddy Tribe, 47 Fed. Reg. 3414 (1982); Notice of 
Receipt and Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child 
Custody Proceedings by the Penobscot Indian Nation, 46 Fed. Reg. 27,397 (1981); Ap-
proval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child Custody Proceed-
ings by the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, Hayward, 
Wis., 46 Fed. Reg. 15,579 (1981); Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction 
over Indian Child Custody Proceedings by the Colville Confederated Tribes, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 56,450 (1980); Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian 
Child Custody Proceedings by the Muckleshoot Tribe, 45 Fed. Reg. 49,363 (1980); Ap-
proval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child Custody Proceed-
ings by the Spokane Tribe, 45 Fed. Reg. 47,926 (1980); Approval of Petition for Reas-
sumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child Custody Proceedings by the Omaha Tribe, 45 
Fed. Reg. 20,568 (1980); and Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction Con-
federated Tribes and Bands, Yakima Indian Nation, 45 Fed. Reg. 6479 (1980). For a 
recent petition for reassumption of jurisdiction, see Receipt of Petition for Reassumption 
of Jurisdiction; Ely Colony Council of Ely, NV, 50 Fed. Reg. 43,007 (1985). 
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the petitioning tribe180 and offer technical assistance to correct 
the defect in the original plan.181 After the tribe has taken action 
to overcome the deficiencies of the first petition, the tribe may 
re-petition for recognition. 182 One tribe whose initial petition 
was not approved has reassumed jurisdiction under the re-peti-
tioning procedure. 183 
A similar procedure should be used for recognition of the civil 
adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribes that have not been made sub-
ject to state jurisdiction.184 A tribe seeking federal recognition of 
its civil adjudicatory jurisdiction in a certain subject area would 
submit a petition setting out its plan for exercising jurisdiction. 
The petition should include a citation to the provision in the 
tribal constitution authorizing the tribal court to exercise juris-
diction, a description of the tribal court, copies of tribal ordi-
nances establishing court procedures, and an estimate of the 
population of the reservation. The Assistant Secretary for In-
dian Affairs should approve the petition as long as it is complete 
and the tribal court appears able to exercise jurisdiction in a 
manner that meets the requirements of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act. A tribe whose petition is not approved should receive tech-
nical assistance to correct the deficiencies perceived by the As-
sistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary would publish a no-
tice in the Federal Register stating that the Department of the 
Interior has approved a petition for recognition, and that the 
tribe will exercise jurisdiction over the subject area in question. 
The tribal court's jurisdiction should be recognized as exclusive, 
unless Congress has granted state jurisdiction, in which case it 
shall be concurrent. 
Once a tribe's civil jurisdiction has been formally recognized 
in all civil subject-matter areas, its tribal courts will be able to 
operate with the certainty that their exercise of jurisdiction will 
be respected. Non-Indians who enter into reservation-based con-
tracts, for example, will have notice that disputes over the con-
tract will be decided in tribal court. Non-Indians entering the 
reservation, or residing on it, will have notice that torts they 
commit on the reservation will be litigated in tribal court. Tribal 
courts would be able to assume a complete role in the adjudica-
180. 25 C.F.R. § 13.14(c) (1986). 
181. Id. § 13.16. 
182. Id. § 13.14(d). 
183. See 46 Fed. Reg. 15,579 (1981) (Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians). 
184. See supra note 79. 
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tion of civil disputes involving both Indians and non-Indians on 
the reservation. 
B. Implementation 
To fully effectuate this Note's proposal, a number of impor-
tant changes must first be made. Tribes that wish to assert juris-
diction over civil disputes involving non-Indians must modify 
tribal codes and constitutions that do not authorize their court 
system to exercise such jurisdiction. 18~ In some cases these modi-
fications require approval by the BIA. 186 Tribes must also deter-
mine what laws will be applied in the subject area in which they 
are seeking certification of their courts' jurisdiction, 187 if they 
have not already done so, and fill in any gaps in the content of 
tribal law codes.188 
In some cases, changes are needed in the attitudes of tribal 
government officials. Judges in some tribal court systems have 
complained of tribal council interference with the courts.189 Tri-
bal governments that have not yet done so must recognize the 
need for independent operation of the courts and the important 
role tribal courts play in furthering tribal self-government and 
self-determination.10O 
Attitudes of neighboring jurisdictions also must change. Tribal 
courts have difficulty getting neighboring jurisdictions to recog-
nize their judgments.191 Recognition, when given, is often infor-
mal and inconsistent.192 Very few states currently give full faith 
and credit to tribal judgments.193 Clearly, for formal certification 
by the federal government that a tribe has exclusive jurisdiction 
over a subject area to be meaningful, tribal exercises of that ju-
185. See supra note 153. 
186. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 41-42. 
187. Tribal courts use a mixture of tribal code provisions and federal, state, and 
traditional law. Tribal codes commonly provide that state law can be applied when an 
area is not covered by code provisions. Id. at 43. For recommendations on tribal legisla-
tion and codification, see id. at 97 (inadequate tribal laws), 110-12 (codification and cus-
tomary law), 113-14 (juvenile law). Reexamination of all tribal law and tribal codes was 
suggested. Id. at 156-61. 
188. Id. at 39, 97. 
189. Id. at 39-40, 70-71, 86, 94. 
190. Id. at 86 ("[S]upport for courts is increasing, and many judges stated that tribal 
government officials have begun to realize that the tribal court ultimately defends the 
tribe's sovereignty."). 
191. Id. at 80. 
192. Id. 
193. As of 1978, only two states gave full faith and credit to tribal judgments. Id. 
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risdiction must be recognized by other court systems. As the So-
licitor of the Interior stated in 1934, "[I]n the fields of civil con-
troversy the rules and decisions of the tribe and its officers have 
a force that State courts and Federal courts will respect."194 
Once tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all reserva-
tion-based civil cases formally recognized by the federal govern-
ment, and their judgments receive full faith and credit in other 
jurisdictions, they will be able to exercise the same responsibili-
ties as other local court systems, 1911 and thus play an important 
role in the full development of tribal self-government. 
CONCLUSION 
Indian tribal courts are an important element in the achieve-
ment of the congressional goal of Indian self-government and 
self-determination. Tribal court civil jurisdiction extends to all 
reservation-based disputes unless that jurisdiction has been re-
stricted by federal action. In National Farmers Union Insur-
ance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the extent of tribal court jurisdiction over civil cases 
involving non-Indians is a question of federal law that should 
first be examined by the tribal court, but the tribal court juris-
dictional decision can be reviewed in federal district court. A 
layer of federal court review is thus imposed above the tribal 
court systems, constituting a degree of federal court interference 
that is contrary to the intention of Congress and the Executive. 
A better approach to establishing the boundaries of tribal 
court civil jurisdiction is to establish a procedure in the Depart-
ment of the Interior whereby an individual tribe could petition 
for federal recognition of its exclusive, retained civil jurisdiction. 
Tribes could apply for recognition of jurisdiction over individual 
subject areas, so that recognition would take place in an orderly 
manner reflecting tribal interests and capabilities. Once the fed-
eral government formally recognizes tribal adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion, reservation residents and visitors will have notice that tri-
bal courts will exercise jurisdiction over reservation-based civil 
cases, and tribal judgments will be entitled to full faith and 
194. Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solie. Interior 445, 471 (1934). 
195. 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 13. 
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credit. The tribal courts will then be able to play their proper 
role in tribal government. 
-Allison M. Dussias 
